Tommy Skaug
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159 lines
5.8 KiB
Markdown
159 lines
5.8 KiB
Markdown
## Key Takeaways
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* While market dominance was formerly an issue discussed for
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operating systems, the modern equivalent occurs in form of cloud
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services, primarily from Microsoft, Amazon and Google.
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* Data from the Norwegian business registry mapped to email
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records shows that Microsoft Office 365 has become a dominating
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force amongst Norwegian private businesses and 61% of the
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government.
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* Microsoft being a significant actor for email indicates that
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Norwegian organisations are putting a lot more faith in
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Microsoft. Today email as a service is bundled with direct
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messaging and wikis.
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## Introduction
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In 2003 Dan Geer, Bruce Schneier and others wrote a paper named
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"How the Dominance of Microsoft's Products Poses a Risk to
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Security". It eventually cost Geer his job at AtStake.
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The paper evolves around Microsoft's dominance in operating
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systems and Geer has later given Microsoft credit for a better
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approach to security [2].
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In this article I am not going to reiterate on the points made by
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Geer et àl. I think these are perfectly valid and easily
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transferrable to the current landscape. The whole paper is
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read-worthy, but I'd like highlight one part:
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> Governments, and perhaps only governments, are in leadership
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> positions to affect how infrastructures develop. By enforcing
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> diversity of platform to thereby blunt the monoculture risk,
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> governments will reap a side benefit of increased market
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> reliance on interoperability, which is the only foundation for
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> effective incremental competition and the only weapon against
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> end-user lock-in. A requirement that no operating system be more
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> than 50% of the installed based in a critical industry or in a
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> government would moot monoculture risk. Other branches to the
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> risk diversification tree can be foliated to a considerable
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> degree, but the trunk of that tree on which they hang is a total
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> prohibition of monoculture coupled to a requirement of
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> standards-based interoperability.
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Azure is Windows in 2021. The walled gardens are somewhat
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redefined - but they are there in a similar fashion as Windows was
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in 2003. The Microsoft monopoly is technically broken, and there
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are now options from Amazon, Google and even Apple, but I would
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argue the monoculture is still present in shared approaches,
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infrastructure and concepts.
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I decided to have a closer look at the distribution from a
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representative dataset provided by an authorative source in
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Norway; the business registry.
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## Taking a Close Look at The Data
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In Norway we a public registry of organisations. This registry is
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categorised by standardised sector codes (typically "government",
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"private" and so on). Using the JSON-data provided by brreg.no, a
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list of websites can be extracted:
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1. Retrieve the organisation list from brreg.no [1]
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```
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curl https://data.brreg.no/enhetsregisteret/api/enheter/lastned > enheter.gz
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gzip -d enheter.gz
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```
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2. Reshape the JSON data by website URL, sector and business code.
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```
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cat enheter |
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jq '[.[] | select(.hjemmeside != null) | {url:.hjemmeside, code:.naeringskode1.kode, sector:.institusjonellSektorkode.kode}]' > webpages.txt
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```
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3. Based on the URL, add the primary domain and resolve its MX
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record and the MX primary domain to each JSON entity
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4. Using the JSON-file generated above, populate the following
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JSON dictionary. This is also a rough categorisation based on
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the standard provided by Statistics Norway (I'm sure it could
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be improved) [4]:
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```
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{
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"government":{"codes": [6100,6500,1110,1120], "total":0, "counts":{}},
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"municipals":{"codes": [1510,4900,1520], "total":0, "counts":{}},
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"finance":{"codes": [3200,3500,3600,4300,3900,4100,4500,4900,5500,5700,4900,7000], "total":0, "counts":{}},
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"private":{"codes": [4500,4900,2100,2300,2500], "total":0, "counts":{}}
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}
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```
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5. Generate CSV output based on each sector grouping above.
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## The Result
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The top vendor was not surprising Microsoft's outlook.com. For the
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120k sites, 98k resolved an MX record. Of these I will give an
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outlook.com summary as follows, as it would seem this is the
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dominating actor in all categories:
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* In government 61% is O365 users (1420/2317)
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* For municipals, the amount is 55% (688/1247)
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* For the diverse financial grouping, 21% uses O365 (4836/23125)
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* For the diverse private companies 38% uses O365 (14615/38129)
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Of the 98k sites Microsoft runs the email service for 21559
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organisations. For comparison Google MX domains accounts
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for about 5500.
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While the above are directly a measurement of who delivers email
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services, it also indicated that these organisations relies on
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other services, such as internal wikis and direct messaging.
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An overview of the top 10 vendors are shown below.
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![](static/img/data/mx_domains.png)
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## Sources of Errors
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Even though I believe the statistics above is representative it
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has some possible sources of error:
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1. The organisation isn't listed with URL in the organisation
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registry or it uses a domain not associated with the primary
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domain of its web address
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2. The organisation uses an SMTP proxy
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3. The organisation has an inactive SMTP record
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I found that there are more than 1 million listed organisations in
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the brreg.no registry and 120k websites in the JSON data
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provided. This means this dataset represent at most 12% of the
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companies listed.
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Also, email doesn't represent a diverse infrastructure, but I
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believe it is an indicator of the current trends also for other
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cloud services in e.g. Azure, Google Compute Engine and so on.
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[1] CyberInsecurity: The Cost of Monopoly, Geer et àl, 2003 -
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https://cryptome.org/cyberinsecurity.htm
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[2] Cybersecurity as Realpolitik by Dan Geer presented at Black
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Hat USA 2014: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nT-TGvYOBpI
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[3] https://data.brreg.no/enhetsregisteret/api/enheter/lastned
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[4] https://www.ssb.no/klass/klassifikasjoner/39
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